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1. Introduction and statement of the problem                       
 
Conventional models are failing throughout the world. In the developed world, the welfare state-
compensation model has been in retrenchment for some time, and the drawbacks of the neoliberal 
conception that has superseded it are increasingly evident. Yet there is no compelling alternative on 
offer. In the developing world, the conventional, tried-and-tested model of industrialization has run out 
of steam. In both sets of societies a combination of technological and economic forces (in particular, 
globalization) is creating or exacerbating productive/technological dualism, with a segment of advanced 
production in metropolitan areas that thrives on the uncertainty generated by the knowledge economy 
co-existing with a mass of relatively less productive activities and communities that neither contributes 
to nor benefits from innovation. The sizes of these two sectors and the trajectories leading into them 
may vary, but otherwise the nature of the underlying problem seems to have converged in the 
developed and developing worlds. 
This productive/technological dualism is in turn responsible for many of the ills these societies face: 
inequality, exclusion, spatial/social segmentation, loss of trust in elites/governments/experts, the 
populist backlash, and authoritarian politics. Left to their own, globalization and new technologies look 
likely to aggravate these divisions and the pathologies that flow from them. 
Much of our policy conversation today focuses on solutions that elide the true source of the problem. Ex 
post redistribution through taxes and transfers accepts the productive structure as given, and merely 
ameliorates the results through handouts. Investments in education, universal basic income (UBI), and 
social wealth funds seek to enhance the endowments of the workforce, without ensuring productive 
integration. Broadly speaking the same can be said about the Keynesian approach to job creation, 
through aggregate demand management. Keynesianism aims at static efficiency—closing the gap 
between actual and potential output where the potential output is fixed enough to be precisely 
calculable. Dualism entrenched enough to shape long-term growth expectations—just the kind of 
structural deformation of the economy that most concerns us—cannot be addressed by demand 
management, short, perhaps, of mobilization for war. Though lax enforcement of anti-trust laws may 
have contributed to the concentration of industry in recent decades, and exacerbated inequality by 
allowing oligopolists to increase their markups or use monopsony power in labor markets to drive down 
wages, redress through a new round of trust busting is at best a very partial solution to the larger 
problem, and then only in the long term. 
What we seek to explore here is a set of interventions by the public sector – or its delegated agencies – 
directly in the productive sphere, and in direct collaboration with the most productive segments of the 
private sector. These interventions are targeted at expanding productive employment opportunities by 
supporting firms and workers in their efforts to acquire and extend the capacities needed to participate 
in the dynamic sector of the economy. We call it a strategy of “building a good jobs economy.”  
The definition of “good job” is necessarily slippery. We have in mind in the first instance stable, formal-
sector employment that comes with core labor protections such as safe working conditions, collective 
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bargaining rights, and regulations against arbitrary dismissal. A good job enables at least a middle-class 
existence, by a region’s standards, with enough income for housing, food, transportation, education, 
and other family expenses, as well as some saving. More broadly, good jobs provide workers with clear 
career paths, possibilities of self-development, flexibility, responsibility, and fulfillment. The depth and 
range of such characteristics may depend on context: the prevailing levels of productivity and economic 
development, costs of living, prevailing income gaps, and so on. We expect each community to set its 
own standards and aspirations, which will evolve over time. In practice, the characterization of good 
jobs can be as “provisional” as many of the other features of the programs we will describe in this paper.  
Our approach has three, mutually re-enforcing components: increasing the skill level and productivity of 
existing jobs, and the competitiveness of firms, for example through provision of extension services to 
improve management or cooperative programs to advance technology; increasing the number of good 
jobs by supporting startups, the expansion of existing, local firms or attracting investment by outsiders—
what the many state and local programs (of greatly varying quality) currently directed to this last 
purpose refer to simply as “economic development”; and active labor market policies or workforce 
development programs to help workers, especially from at-risk groups, master the skills required for 
good jobs. Redistribution, Keynesian demand management and anti-trust policies can and should be 
important complements to such interventions; alone or in combination they cannot be a substitute for 
them.  
Public-private collaborations are at the heart of this strategy. Our focus is on the design principles 
needed to govern these collaborations. Such principles do not need to be invented from scratch. We 
argue that they can be borrowed from existing innovative governance arrangements firms, regulators 
and other public agencies have already developed in response to the market and technological 
uncertainties they face. These arrangements have not been typically deployed in pursuit of good jobs, 
but they can be adapted to that end. 
Active labor market policies have begun to receive considerable attention. A number of studies have  
reviewed development experience on the ground with some resemblance to the good jobs program. 
Austin et al. (2018) survey “place-based’ policies such as regionally targeted employment subsidies and 
infrastructure investment; Miller-Adams et al. (2019) review program focused on creating good jobs in 
communities that face economic challenges; and Autor et al. (2019) summarize evidence on the impact 
of educational and other interventions. A common theme is the inter-related and conditional nature of 
the remedies: very few program elements work off the shelf and reliably across diverse settings. For 
example, Miller-Adams et al. (2019) recommend differentiated strategies that combine skill 
development strategies (targeted at the local workforce) with programs to attract businesses (targeted 
at employers). They emphasize the provision of customized services to firms tailored to local conditions. 
In view of the inherent uncertainty about “what works,” we focus here not on specific interventions or 
policies, but on a meta-intervention regime for generating good jobs in many different areas of 
economic activity. We describe a set of design principles for building dynamic governance arrangements 
that sustain public-private collaborations under conditions of uncertainty and learning, through ongoing 
review and revision of objectives, instruments, and benchmarks. 
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The most familiar variant of a “meta-regime” of this general type is collective bargaining, or some close 
social partnership or neo-corporatist analogue. The expectation is that, in return for a secure place in 
the constitutional order, labor and capital will bargain to achieve public-regarding outcomes. But for 
decades now such arrangements have failed because of some combination of inability to adjust to 
uncertain and diverse conditions, self-dealing by incumbents at the expense of outsiders. To address 
both failings we found the meta-regime on governance principles subjecting all decisions to continuing 
mutual scrutiny by stakeholders under public oversight. These innovative modes of governance, we 
argue further, allow the parties, beginning with only a thin understanding of the substance and scope of 
their goals, to assess one another’s capacities and good faith in the very process of refining ideas of 
what the eventual project should be. Trust and coalition building—the preconditions for meta-regimes 
built on social partnership—are the outcome of joint problem solving under this governance. The good-
jobs strategy can only succeed in the end with the support of a wide and robust coalition. We argue that 
building consensus through problem solving helps ensure that mobilization is put to effective use.  
We proceed as follows. First, we argue that the shortfall in “good jobs” can be viewed as a massive 
market failure – a kind of gross economic malfunction, and not just a source of inequality and economic 
exclusion. Next, we make the case that standard regulatory instruments such as Pigovian subsidies 
cannot deal with this problem. Pervasive uncertainty, dependence on differentiated local conditions, 
and the evolving nature of the goals call for a high-dimensional policy space and an iterative model of 
strategic collaboration between private actors and the state. We illustrate the organizational framework 
we have in mind using examples from two analogous policy domains where the principles are already in 
application: fostering of advanced technologies (DARPA and ARPA-E) and environmental regulation of 
(dairy farming in Ireland).  
We then sketch out how these ideas can be applied in principle to the specific domain of good jobs, and 
briefly review their actual application to the three components of the strategy. The focus is on 
workforce development, where promising and arguably generalizable outcomes have been achieved 
under governance principles closely approximating those set out here. By way of conclusion we caution 
against the intellectual pessimism about job creation strategies that haunts many careful reviews of 
program evaluations, and suggest a reason for optimism with regard to the formation of the political will 
needed to build a good jobs economy. We should not make too much of disappointing reviews of 
program performance because, some recent studies aside, those reviews and the evaluations on which 
they are based do not discriminate between one-size-fits all programs and more successful programs 
that adapt policy to changing local circumstance. We see cause for some optimism on political will in the 
possibility that once in limited operation the governance arrangements we propose may help create and 
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2. “Good jobs” as a source of positive externality               
 
The sources of the externality 
We begin by establishing that producing good jobs is a source of positive externality for society. From an 
economic standpoint, the issues are analogous to those that arise in the cases of environmental 
externalities or R&D externalities, two domains on which we will draw when we develop our 
organizational recommendations. 
A firm considers labor as a production input, with the market wage as its cost. In the short run, the wage 
rate determines the firm’s desired level of employment. In the medium-run, it also determines the kind 
of technologies the firm invests in and the production technique – the mix between labor and various 
forms of capital. When wages rise, either because of greater productivity or enhanced bargaining power 
of labor, firms try to economize on the use of labor and adopt technologies that replace workers. From a 
society’s standpoint, the result is an undesirable trade-off between good jobs and the level of 
employment. Today’s economies tend to manage this trade-off by allowing dualistic labor markets to 
become entrenched (Temin 2017): islands of productive, high-wage activities exist in a sea of poor jobs. 
Labor market and social policies generally determine the distance between working conditions in the 
two sectors. But a higher floor on economy-wide wages generally comes at the expense of higher 
unemployment and lower labor hours.  
Some version of this trade-off has existed throughout history. In growing economies the tension is 
typically alleviated by an economy-wide rise in productivity, which suppresses the distinction between 
insider and outsider jobs. For example, the mechanization of agriculture during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries created a surplus of labor in the countryside. But the workers who flooded into urban centers 
could be absorbed into manufacturing activities (and related services) where productivity and wages 
were even higher. De-industrialization during the second half of the 20th century led to a similar, but 
more challenging dilemma. Rapid labor productivity growth in manufacturing (and import competition) 
resulted in a loss of production jobs and a shift to employment in services, where wages and 
employment conditions were often inferior. Today’s technological trends – automation, the knowledge 
economy, digital technologies – are leading to a significant exacerbation of the problem. The 
productivity effects of these new technologies remain bottled in a limited number of sectors and 
metropolitan locations, generating relatively small numbers of good jobs, while the rest of the economy 
remains stagnant (Remes et al., 2018). “Where will the good jobs come from?” is perhaps the defining 
question of our contemporary political economy.   
We do not view this simply as a problem of inequality and exclusion, but also as a problem of gross 
economic inefficiency – a case of operating deep inside the production possibility frontier, or in other 
economic terms, positive and negative externalities.      
The central distinction in an externality is between private and social costs. When private costs of 
production of, say, a polluting firm do not take account of the costs to society of its pollution, the result 
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is a negative externality. When the social benefits of, say, a location decision exceed the gains to the 
investing firm, the externality is positive.  Communities where middle-class jobs have gone scarce suffer 
from a variety of social ailments: Bad jobs, by the undermining the social structures that underpin 
economic prosperity. create enormous negative externalities.1  
In his path-breaking book When Work Disappears, sociologist William Julius Wilson (1996) described at 
length the social costs of the decline in the number manufacturing and blue-collar jobs, ranging from 
broken families to drug abuse and crime. While Wilson’ focus was on racial minorities living in inner-city 
ghetto neighborhoods, his argument applies more broadly. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2018) studied 
communities across the entire U.S., differentiating them by the degree to which they were affected by 
import competition with China. Communities where jobs came under greatest pressure from Chinese 
imports experienced an increase in “idleness” among young males (the state of being neither employed 
nor in school) and a rise in male mortality due to drug and alcohol abuse, HIV/AIDS, and homicide. Job 
loss also led to an increase in the fraction of unwed mothers, of children in single-headed households, 
and of children living in poverty.     
These economic and social impacts of good jobs going scarce are compounded by the political 
consequences. There is by now considerable evidence from a number of advanced market economies 
that links the rise of nativist populist political movements to adverse labor market developments. In the 
United States, Autor et al. (2017) have shown that the China trade shock had a significant impact on 
political polarization. Holding constant initial political conditions in 2002, districts that experienced 
sharper increases in import competition were less likely to elect a “moderate” legislator in 2010. New 
legislators elected in hardest hit areas tend to occupy more extreme positions on the ideological 
spectrum, especially on the right. Districts initially in Republican hands were substantially more likely to 
elect a GOP conservative. What is perhaps the most intriguing implication of this research is that the 
labor market disruptions due to the China trade shock may have been directly responsible for Donald 
Trump’s electoral victory in 2016. Autor et al. undertake a counterfactual analysis in which they assume 
the growth of Chinese import penetration is 50 percent lower than the realized rate over the 2002-2014 
period. Their estimates on the electoral consequences indicate that a Democrat instead of a Republican 
presidential candidate would have been elected in 2016 in the swing states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Pennsylvania. The Democratic candidate would also have obtained an overall majority in the Electoral 
College under this counterfactual scenario.  
A recent paper on Sweden traces out very similar political consequences, even though the shocks that 
led to labor market disruption were of a different nature (Dal Bò et al., 2018). A series of reforms after 
2006 under a Conservative-led coalition reduced social insurance and transfer benefits while lowering 
taxes, increasing the disposable income gap between “insiders” and “outsiders” – those with steady jobs 
and those who were either unemployed or relied on temporary jobs. The post-2008 financial crisis and 
                                                 
1  Austin et al. (2018) consider three sources of economic externalities from non-employment: fiscal costs on the 
state through the tax-transfer system, costs imposed on the family, and spillovers that encourage non-
employment by others in the community. They reckon these costs range 0.21-0.36 times the wage of low-
income workers. Our focus here is on social and political costs that we believe are much higher. 
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recession helped widen the gap. The main beneficiary appears to have been the right-wing, anti-
immigrant Sweden Democrats party. The authors show that the local insider-outsider income gaps and 
the share of vulnerable insiders are positively correlated with larger electoral gains by the Sweden 
Democrats. Exposure to immigrants, on the other hand, is not systematically associated with support for 
the political right. The fundamental cause of nativist politics seems to be decline in secure, good jobs 
rather than cultural or xenophobic preferences per se.  
Similar results have been reported for other European countries. Analyzing the political realignment 
behind Brexit, Colantone and Stanig (2016) attribute a key role to the labor market impact of 
globalization. Using an Autor et al.-type China trade shock variable, they show regions with larger import 
penetration from China had a higher Leave vote share. They corroborate this finding with individual-
level data from the British Election Survey that shows individuals in regions more affected by the import 
shock were more likely to vote for Leave, conditional on education and other characteristics. A second 
paper by Colantone and Stanig (2017) undertakes a parallel analysis for fifteen European countries over 
the 1988-2007 period. It finds that the China trade shock played a statistically (and quantitatively) 
significant role across regions and at the individual level. A larger import shock was associated with 
support for nationalist parties and a shift towards radical right-wing parties. Guiso et al. (2017) look at 
European survey data on individual voting behavior and find an important role for economic insecurity – 
including exposure to competition from imports and immigrants – in driving populist parties’ growth. 
Individuals who experience greater economic insecurity were also less likely to show up at the polls.    
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the political consequences of adverse labor market shocks is that 
such shocks weaken support for democracy and foster authoritarian attitudes. The association between 
economic crisis and the rise of fascism in interwar Europe is well known (Frieden, 2006). More broadly, 
economic stagnation or decline among the middle classes undermines the set of moral values and 
beliefs that sustain liberal democracy (Friedman, 2005). There is evidence from our current moment in 
history that some of the same tendencies are at play. In the United States, individuals located in local 
labor markets that were more substantially affected by imports from China appear to have developed 
more authoritarian values (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2018). Similarly, individuals living in European regions 
that received more negative globalization shocks were systematically less supportive of democracy and 
liberal values and more in favor of authoritarian leaders (Colantone and Stanig, 2018).  
In short, there are significant economic, social, and political costs of failure to generate good jobs. Bad 
jobs lead to lagging communities with poor social outcomes (health, education, crime) and social and 
political strife (populist backlash, democratic malfunction). A private employer fails to take these costs 
into account, unless prompted to do by the state. The empirical literature suggests that these negative 
externalities are substantial—perhaps so great that they threaten the economic order underpinning our 
form of government. Good jobs, conversely, have enormous positive externalities. 
Our focus on the social externality of good jobs is a key difference from approaches that revolve around 
firm-level practices. For example, in her well-known book The Good Jobs Strategy, Zeynep Ton 
advocates a range of employment policies such as higher wages and benefits that she argues could help 
employers as well as employees. The argument, nicely encapsulated in her subtitle, is that smart 
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companies can boost profits by investing in their employers. We do not deny that such opportunities 
exist, and that firms may do well by doing good for their workers. But as Osterman (2018) emphasizes in 
a recent review, the evidence that profit maximizing firms can benefit from “high road” employment 
practices is limited and far from overwhelming. The vast majority of firms may not be inclined to offer or 
expand good jobs unless the strategy is part of a concerted collaboration with public agencies in which 
they are offered something in return. That something could be either carrots in the form of tailored 
public services or the withholding of a stick in the form of tax easements.2  Put starkly, creating good 
jobs under current circumstances makes good sense for society as a whole, but not for many firms. 
Given the enormous costs of bad jobs, closing this gap seems almost  self-evidently an urgent political 
task. 
 
The inadequacy of standard remedies 
Having established that good jobs are a source of positive externalities, we now discuss why standard 
remedies are inadequate.  
The conventional instrument for internalizing an externality is a Pigovian subsidy, which would be a 
generalized employment subsidy in this case. But successful administration of Pigovian subsidies 
requires sufficient information about the size of the externality and (what often amounts to the same 
thing) a relatively static environment. In a dynamic environment with substantial uncertainty, 
alternative regulatory arrangements are often preferable.  
In a classic article, Weitzman (1974) showed that quantity targets may dominate price instruments (such 
as a subsidy) under such conditions. A price instrument (subsidy) minimizes the costs of achieving a 
certain target, at the risk of missing the target (because of uncertainty about supply and demand 
responses, say). Quantitative targets, on the other hand, achieve the requisite social outcome, but 
potentially at greater economic cost than is necessary. When the risks of just missing the socially 
optimal target—making water drinkable, say—outweigh the risks of inadvertently imposing too high a 
clean-up cost on producers, quantity targets are preferable to Pigovian price instruments. The analogous 
argument in the present context is that the risk of failing to generate a sufficient number of good jobs in 
a particular community may dwarf the risk of imposing too high a burden on individual firms.  
Uncertainty also increases the dimensionality of the policy space. In the standard conception of 
externalities, there is a single quantity, with an associated market price, that is responsible for the 
generation of the externality. The appropriate intervention consists of directly targeting that price (or 
                                                 
2 A similar point applies to the relationship between this chapter and the arguments made in the by Henderson 
and Salter chapters of this book. We give government agencies a larger role to play because we presume that 
there will be some but not complete overlap between what firms find to be in their enlightened, long-term interest 
and what is required for inclusive social prosperity more broadly. We also differ from Weyl (this volume) in 
advocating a specific kind of government activism, though our approaches are guided by many of the similar 
principles. In particular, we agree with Weyl that we should move beyond a simplistic state-market dichotomy, 
favor emergent social organizations, and connect social and technological change.   
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quantity), and doing no more than that. But when there is uncertainty about behavior, technology, and 
the effectiveness of different policies, optimal policies – in the second-best sense of the term – will 
range over multiple margins of intervention and several different types of policy instruments. Learning 
about what works and what does not becomes an integral part of the policy process. Establishing 
mechanisms of feedback from firms to public authorities is critical to the regulatory apparatus. The 
relevant policy space is of much higher dimensionality. 
Finally, an additional problem with standard regulatory remedies in the present setting is that they 
postulate clear goals (“objective functions,” in economics jargon). As uncertainty increases, it becomes 
difficult to specify in advance not only the costs and benefits of regulation, but also its precise 
objectives. The government and its agencies will often have to go further and “negotiate” improvement 
targets with individual firms or clusters of firms. What is a good job, how many can be reasonably 
created, how technological and other firm-level choices influence job creation, what are the 
complementary policy levers that are available, how that set of instruments can be expanded – these 
are necessarily local, contextual questions. They can be answered, and periodically revised, only through 
a customized, iterative process of strategic interaction between public agencies and private firms. This 
process is alien to the familiar, principal-agent framework of rule-making which assumes that goals and 
social benefits must be known in advance if public action is to be effective and accountable. But it is the 
hallmark of the new type of regulation to which we turn next. 
 
3. Key features of regulation under extreme uncertainty                             
 
Consider first contracting under uncertainty between private parties (which as we will see in a moment 
closely approximates the ARPA case). Under stable conditions each party can specify precisely what it 
expects in exchange with the other—do ut des. Precision, moreover, is often unnecessary, because in 
stable circumstances the same parties often contract repeatedly which each other; and these relations 
give rise to shared norms and expectations that guide performance even when there are gaps and 
ambiguities in formal agreements. 
But under uncertainty the very trajectory of technology is unforeseeable and solutions in any domain 
are often found by applying ideas that arise far afield. It is neither possible to specify obligations in 
advance nor to rely on shared norms as supplements or substitutes for detailed agreements. Operating 
at the edge of established solutions, neither party can say exactly what is feasible, let alone what the 
other should contribute to the joint effort. When solutions are in view, they will often involve 
collaboration not with familiar partners, but with strangers, with norms and expectations of their own.   
Under these circumstances the nature of contract itself changes. Instead of defining precisely each 
party’s obligations, the agreement establishes broad goals and a regime for evaluating achievement of 
them. As observed in domains as diverse as biotechnology, IT and advanced manufacturing this regime 
establishes regular, joint reviews of progress towards interim targets or milestones, procedures for 
deciding whether and with what exact aim to proceed or not, and mechanisms for resolving 
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disagreements. The information exchanged under such a regime allows the parties to develop a more 
and more precise idea of the shared goal while allowing each to assess with increasingly reliability the 
capacities and good faith of the other: to observe if the capable stranger can become a reliable partner 
and the long-trusted partner is capable of innovative tasks. As collaboration progresses, each party 
comes to rely increasingly on the capacities of the other, deterring opportunistic defection and 
generating or activating norms of reciprocity. Joint regular review and deliberate consideration of the 
interim results thus create the conditions in which informal norms and self-interested calculations bind 
the parties to continue promising collaboration in good faith. Trust and mutual reliance are the result of 
agreement to collaborate, not its precondition, just as the precise aims of cooperation are the outcome, 
not the starting point of joint efforts (Gilson, Sabel & Scott, 2009). 
Regulation under extreme uncertainty arrives at a closely related solution from a somewhat different 
starting point. Under stable conditions mitigation of externalities is mandated by legislation and given 
precise form in consultation between the regulator and the regulated parties (subject to judicial review 
in case of continuing, insistent disagreement). The costs of mitigation are known to the regulated party 
but not (or at least not easily) to the regulator. Addressees of regulation try to use this information 
asymmetry to minimize their costs of adjustment while regulators devise ways of eliciting serviceable 
cost information without being captured by the actors that provide it. The upshot is a fixed set of limits 
on permissible behavior and a schedule of fines for exceeding them. 
Under uncertainty neither the regulator nor the regulated parties have reliable information on the 
possibilities and costs of adjustment in the medium term, and only conjectures regarding the 
possibilities that will open—or not—upon further investigation. Again the response—seen in food 
safety, civil aviation, and pharmaceuticals among many others—is the creation of an information 
exchange regime that ties ongoing specification of goals—here regulatory standards—to continuing 
exploration of new solutions. Typically the regulator, acting as before under a legislative mandate and 
after extensive consolations, establishes an ambitious, open-ended outcome: for example, “good 
water,” as measured by minimal deviation from the pristine state of a particular type of body of water 
such as an alpine stream or Mediterranean river; or a dramatic reduction, over an extended period, in 
vehicular emissions from various sources. The regulated entities—private parties, states or member 
states and their subdivisions in the US or the EU—are obligated to make plans to achieve the goals and 
to regularly report their results. Penalties in this regime are not calculated to deter infraction of clear 
rules but rather to incentivize cooperative production of the information from which standards will 
eventually be derived. Thus penalties are imposed as a rule only for failure to report or to report 
honestly, or for persistent failure to achieve results whose feasibility is demonstrated by the 
attainments of others in like positions; though infrequent, those penalties can be dauntingly severe, 
often amounting to exclusion from the market or (for public addressees) severe limits on decision-
making autonomy. In contract law such information forcing sanctions are often called penalty defaults 
and we adopt that term here. 
The combination of ambitious, open-ended goals, planning obligations and threat of potentially 
draconian penalties for obstinately uncooperative behavior encourage investigation of new possibilities, 
including contextualized variants of general solutions, and collaboration among regulated parties and 
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between them as a group and the regulator. As long as some actors are looking to set new standards 
though their innovations—creating markets for innovative technology they develop, or simply putting 
competitors under pressure to match their performance—others will be less willing to cling to the status 
quo at the risk of being caught out when methods advance. In an environment where the development 
of technology is uncertain precisely because of the continually surprising abundance of opportunities it 
affords, the expansive search for innovation is likely to feed on itself, with inquiry generating more 
inquiry, if only to minimize the chances of being surprised by developments. Search is likely to be 
collaborative either because projects are interdisciplinary and require the combined efforts of different 
specialists or because any one approach, interdisciplinary or not, is likely to fail and many actors will 
consider it prudent to pool the risks of exploration through various forms of collaboration.  
Taken together many concurrent searches will yield a stream of surprises, unsettling understanding of 
what is technically possible and raising questions about what regulation can and should reasonably 
require. “Notice and comment”—the one-time consultation of stakeholders required in rule making by 
regulatory agencies in the US—gives way to regular, organized exchanges as regulators and addressees 
seek to establish common expectation in the face of rapidly evolving knowledge. Mutual ignorance and 
fear of surprises further bolsters information sharing between public and private actors just as it does 
among the latter. By making it risky to bet on the status quo and potentially rewarding to try to surpass 
it this regulatory regime turns uncertainty itself from an obstacle to demanding standards into a spur to 
collective learning that shows, cumulatively, how to realize them. 
 
4. The environmental and R&D analogues                             
 
In this section, we discuss two successful examples of regulation—understood in the broad sense of 
public measures addressing externalities—under dynamic and uncertain conditions. The first is the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and its offspring, the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency-Energy (ARPA-E). They respond to the characteristic learning externalities that arise at the far 
frontier of science and technology, where for now there may well be no solution at all to a particular 
problem, and the search for one will likely end in costly disappointment. Worse still for the private 
investor, even when the search is successful it is unlikely that the daring pioneer can appropriate the 
returns from the discovery. The predictable result is underinvestment, from the standpoint of society as 
a whole, in research and technology. The second example is regulation by the EU and Ireland of Irish 
water quality and the Irish dairy industry generally. It illustrates the distinctive difficulties associated 
with mitigation of environmental externalities: Even when solutions can be developed in principle, it is 
difficult to estimate the costs of applying them, especially since, to be effective, general measures must 
be adapted to highly differentiated local circumstances. The familiar result is regulation that, for fear of 
imposing intolerable burdens on regulated parties, is often too timid to be effective; or when resolute, 
regulation that is ineffective for failure to take account of local particularity. Neither case is perfectly 
congruent to the “good jobs” challenge. But the success of both is due to the emergence of common 
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mechanisms of governance under uncertainty that, we will argue, can make the good jobs strategy 
workable and accountable. 
 
DARPA and ARPA-E 
 
In discussions of industrial policy the DARPA, created in 1958 in response to the Soviet launch of the 
sputnik satellite, is often and usefully invoked as a reminder that the knowledge economy was not 
created solely by private actors—entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and technologists—responding only 
to opportunities signaled by markets. Far from being a mere bystander, the state, acting through DARPA 
and related agencies, played, and continues to play, a fundamental role in organizing the research from 
which are hewn the building blocks of the information economy. Among its iconic contributions are the 
computer network protocols underlying the internet, precursors to the global positioning systems and 
fundamental tools and devices for microprocessor design and fabrication. The accomplishments of 
DARPA have inspired a number of research agencies on similar lines, of which ARPA-E—a program 
created in the wake of the financial crisis to foster innovation in the energy sector—is both the most 
successful and the most faithful to the procedures of the original model.  
 
Recent studies of ARPA-E examine in detail the institutional mechanisms by which such public entities 
can orient, coordinate and discipline collaborative investigation at the outer edge of technical 
possibility. If those mechanisms are today commonplace or rapidly becoming so it is not because 
DARPA’s methods are widely emulated but rather because more and more organizations, public and 
private, are adapting to the high-uncertainty environment, once exotic, that shaped DARPA from the 
first. 
 
ARPA-E’s overarching goal in establishing programs is to eliminate “white spaces” in the landscape of 
technical knowledge: missing capabilities, just beyond the frontier of current technical possibility, which, 
if mastered, would clear the way to advances in an important domain. A program might, for example, 
aim to support investigation of novel battery concepts with the potential to reduce storage costs by 
enough to make an environmentally attractive class of electricity grid designs economically feasible. At 
every stage in the organization of research—the definition of programs of investigation; selection of a 
portfolio of projects advancing the program purpose; and supervision of individual projects in the 
portfolio—ARPA-E treats goals as provisional, or corrigible in the light of experience. As with the 
contracts among innovating parties discussed above precise goals are the result of a search, not fixed 
from the first.  
ARPA-E’s program directors (PDs) play a key role in the collaborative setting and revision of goals. PDs 
are hired largely on the basis of their promise in giving direction to an emergent area of investigation:  A 
candidate with a background in geology will be hired to create a program in advanced geothermal 
energy. Once program goals have been framed, the PD does a “deep dive,” supplementing and 
correcting her own background experience with reviews of the scientific literature, site visits to 
universities and companies by ARPA-E technical staff, commissioned external studies and consultation 
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with Department of Energy research managers. PDs then test the practicality of the emerging research 
area in technical workshops involving leading engineering, scientific and commercial experts. If the 
research plan, adjusted to reflect the exchanges at the workshop, passes review a project is formally 
created as a component of the developing program. 
Proposals for research within the projects are developed and executed in the same manner, with goals 
open to recurrent challenge and revision. Applicants first submit a concept paper: a short document 
explaining why the proposal is superior to alternative approaches, and how it responds to foreseeable 
technical and commercial risks. Proposals that survive a first round of external review are developed 
into full applications and reviewed again, with the difference that applicants may rebut criticism by 
external reviewers. The winners, designated “research partners” or “performers,” then negotiate 
project milestones with Agency staff.  
The execution of the project is subject, in the argot of ARPA-E, to “active project management,” a 
process with a strong family resemblance to the information-generating regime in contracting for 
innovation. Its most conspicuous feature is the quarterly progress report that research partners must 
provide for review by PDs and Agency staff.3 Missed milestones can touch off an intensification of site 
visits, conference calls, meetings and written analysis of problems and possible solutions. When projects 
struggle milestones can be reset to permit an alternative to the failed approach. Milestones are added 
or deleted in fully 45 percent of the projects, not counting substantive modifications, which are said to 
be frequent. If recovery efforts fail, the PD sends an “at risk” letter warning of the possibility of 
termination. In short the Agency rejects the model of hands-off, bet-on-the-person-not-the-project 
administration preferred by many established and successful research funders, public and private, in 
favor of the continuous, collaborative review and adjustment adopted in biotechnology, advanced 
manufacturing and venture capital. 
ARPA-E is too new to permit any evaluation of its long-term impact: The energy industry—where even 
demonstration projects require substantial investment, innovators immediately confront legacy 
providers and regulation is more likely to constrain innovation than, as in pharmaceuticals, 
accommodate it—changes so gradually that large transformations only slowly become visible. But the 
available evidence does strongly suggest that ARPA-E is indeed choosing projects in the zone of 
uncertainty—where the positive externalities of research and development will be especially large—and 
using its information-generating regime effectively to make the most of its choices. 
Expert disagreement about what is possible is a good working definition of uncertainty.4 If ARPA-E funds 
uncertain projects it should select projects whose prospects the best experts—its reviewers—disagree. 
                                                 
3  Formally cooperation between ARPA-E and recipients of research awards is governed by a cooperation 
agreement that specifies that the “Prime Recipient…is required to participate in periodic review meetings 
[to]…enable ARPA-E to assess the work performed under this Award and determine whether the Prime 
Recipient has timely achieved the technical milestones and deliverables” listed in an attachment. A sample 
agreement is available at https://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=site-page/funding-agreements.  
4  Frank Knight classically distinguished risk—where an outcome is unknown but its probability can be 
estimated—from uncertainty—where it is impossible even to estimate the probability of future states of the 
world. 
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This is what we observe. There is a very slight correlation between reviewers’ ratings of projects and the 
likelihood that they will be funded. Selection is not based on a consensus view of project prospects. 
Perhaps more tellingly, holding the rating constant, the Agency picks the project where the range of 
reviewer rankings is the greatest—where judgements diverge the most. Plainly the PDs and the 
selection committee are relying on other information—rebuttals, observation of the research in 
workshop dialogue with peers, and much else besides. 
Project selection and governance, moreover, do not seem to favor either scientifically oriented projects 
doing basic research validated in journal publications or commercially oriented projects doing applied 
research validated by patents or market engagement. Compared to projects in other branches of the 
DOE doing either basic or applied research, ARPA-E projects have a higher rate of patenting and the 
same high rate of publishing. Most strikingly they are more likely than the specialized projects to 
produce both a publication and patent (Goldstein and Narayanamurti, 2018). A plausible interpretation 
is that they combine practical invention with scientific discovery on the model of use-inspired basic 
research made famous by Pasteur. As we will see next, commercial constraints and the penalty defaults 
imposed by EU environment law have made use-inspired research on similar lines central to the 
regulation of the water quality in Ireland and its dairy industry generally. 
 
Irish dairy farming 
 
Regulation, and especially environmental regulation, differs from ARPA-E’s contractual governance of 
research in two ways. First, agreements between the Agency and award recipients are fully consensual 
(candidates compete for awards). Many addressees of regulation prefer no public constraints on their 
behavior; some actively resist imposition of rules. Penalty defaults therefore play an important role in 
inducing cooperation with the regulator, but none in the formation of award agreements. Second, 
ARPA-E faces uncertainty that arises from manifest limits of our knowledge of science and technology: 
the “white spaces” mark the places where we don’t know the laws of nature that apply to a particular 
problem. Environmental regulation encounters such frontier uncertainty as well; but it is often 
challenged instead or in addition by uncertainties arising from the singularities of place: the way known 
factors—familiar pollutant streams; types of subsoil and geology—combine in particular contexts to 
produce unforeseeable results. “White spaces” get filled in once and for all. Once we learn the 
electrochemistry of cutting energy storage costs by a certain amount, that problem is solved. But 
environmental problems typically have to be re-defined and addressed place by place: they are more 
often white dots than white spaces and filling in one is of limited or no help in filling in an adjacent one. 
In this regard environmental regulation strongly resembles, and can serve as a partial model for 
regulation of the good-jobs externality. In both a central task of governance is creating an information 
exchange regime that induces the local actors to cooperate to contextualize solutions while enabling 
them to benefit from the pooled experience of others, and vice versa.  
 
Within environmental regulation non-point source pollution is the paradigmatic case of contextual 
uncertainty. The regular emissions of large polluters, such as power plants or sewage treatment 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533430
facilities, are (relatively) easy to detect and control. Intermittent emissions from diffuse sources, such as 
the runoff from sporadic detergent use in scattered households, are not. Agricultural runoff is especially 
refractory because of the great variation in the pitch and absorptive capacity from field to field, the stark 
seasonal variations in weather and the rapid changes in the level and nature of productive activity 
induced by cycles of cultivation. We look to advances in the regulation of water pollution in agriculture 
to refine ideas about the governance of contextualization of the good jobs strategy, and to Ireland in 
particular, where pressures to reconcile demanding legal requirements to limit pollution with the needs 
of an expanding dairy industry have produced both an especially sharp understanding of the problem of 
contextual uncertainty and innovative reforms to address it. 
 
The conviction that environmentally sustainable dairying could be a modern engine of growth came late 
to Ireland. Through much of the 20th century Irish dairy farming was dominated by extremely small 
holdings, with limited export opportunities and relatively low productivity and incomes. Membership in 
the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the EU) and its Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) together with imposition of EU milk quotas prompted consolidation, yielding a smaller but more 
efficient and capable cohort of specialized dairy farms still small—measured by farm acreage and herd 
size—in comparison to industrial producers. The Irish coops also consolidated and became first-tier 
suppliers of ingredients to global consumer food firms.5 Ireland—which accounts for less than 1 percent 
of global milk output (Eurostat 2017 and FAO, 2018:5)—supplies almost 15 percent of the world’s infant 
formula market6 and exports 90 percent of its dairy output.7 
Grass is the source of the competitiveness of Irish dairy. The larger representative Irish dairy farm has 
the lowest cash cost to output ratio of the key international milk producing regions, including the US, 
New Zealand and Australia (Thorne et al., 2017: 70). Home-grown, grass feed is much cheaper than 
purchased-feed concentrates; its price is relatively stable, sheltering Irish dairy farmers against a 
substantial risk. Cows that pasture on grass produce milk solids of superior quality; the grazing cow is, 
for watchful consumers in many parts of the world, the emblem of food production at its most natural.  
For all these reasons the Irish dairy sector together with its counterparts in various government 
departments have since the turn of this century come to see the national system of grass-based dairying 
on family farms as a model of production with a bright future, and a central role in the overall 
development of the country—provided it can reconcile increasing efficiency with regulatory and 
consumer demands for environmental sustainability.8  
EU law compelled Ireland to respond, haltingly and reluctantly, to agricultural pollution long before 
farmers, farm organizations, dairy coops, the state extension service—Teagasc—became active 
                                                 
5  The consolidation of Irish milk processing is less pronounced than in Ireland’s major dairy export competitors, 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand, where one company processes as much as 70 or 80 
percent of the milk pool (Prospectus, 2003).  
6  https://www.bordbia.ie/industry/manufacturers/insight/alerts/pages/chinadairyimports.aspx 
7  http://www.bordbiavantage.ie/market-information/sector-overviews/dairy/ 
8  The Food Harvest 2020 strategy of 2010 set a target by 2020 of a 50 percent increase in the volume of milk 
production over the average of 2007-2009 milk supply (4.93 billion liters). The volume of milk production in 
2017 had reached 7.27 billion liters, an increase of 47 percent (CSO 2018) - 
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/ms/milkstatisticsdecember2017). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533430
advocates of sustainability. The Nitrates Directive of 1991 sets out precise concentration limits. Farms 
that fail to comply can be fined or disqualified from the EU single farm payment. Countries which fail to 
meet national limits must submit a plan for improvement to secure a temporary derogation of 
requirements or face the potential application of draconian sanctions typical of penalty defaults.  
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000 has, in contrast, extremely broad objectives: “good 
water,” defined for each type of water body (such as alpine streams or freshwater lakes) as minimal 
deviation from the chemical values and distribution and quantity of life forms associated with a pristine 
body of water of that type. (Poikane et al., 2014). The basic unit of management is the river basin or 
catchment: the contiguous territory that drains into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta. 
Member states produce a six-year River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) for each basin by a 
collaborative process in which public officials, experts and stakeholders specify objectives as well as 
procedures for translating them into concrete activities. Until 2027 counties9 that fall short can submit a 
new RBMP at the end of each planning cycle by asserting that the earlier approach proved technically 
infeasible or disproportionately expensive. Thereafter, as a penalty default, cost and feasibility will not 
excuse non-compliance.  
Implementation of both Directives has proved frustratingly difficult. Adherence to “good practices” in 
agriculture has often failed to produce improvements in nitrate levels;  effective, inclusive participation 
of local actors in the definition and continuing revision of the intentionally open-ended goals has been a 
major stumbling block in the application of the WFD. RBMPs, however made, have not achieved their 
objectives. Many member states will fail to meet the 2027 deadline, and the Directive will be revised in 
2019, among other reasons to reset the penalty default.10 
In Ireland compliance failures triggered a series of research programs to improve understanding and 
control of pollution flows at the catchment and field levels. These programs, linked with similar ones in 
other member states, have helped generate a web of institutions that is coming to function as an 
integrated system of local governance of water quality, greatly expanding public participation in 
environmental decision making in the process. 
In Teagasc’s Agricultural Catchments Programme (ACP) of 2008, for example, six catchment areas, 
differing in soil types, geology and types of farming, were selected to study the relations among farm 
management practices, flows of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorous, and the resulting changes 
in water quality. The ACP’s key finding is that variations in soil and subsoil types, and the underlying 
geology are in combination so influential in the absorption and drainage of nutrients that general rules 
of nutrient management, let alone plans based on them, will regularly fail. Poorly drained fields with 
environmentally innocuous phosphorus values may still pollute because of fast surface runoff while well 
drained soils with alarming phosphorus concentrations may not pollute at all (Shortle & Jordan, 2017: 
                                                 
9  For the guidance documents see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-
framework/facts_figures/guidance_docs_en.htm. For detailed discussion of the CIS as an experimentalist 
institution at the heart of the WFD see Scott & Holder (2006). 
10  On the possibilities for expanding the grounds for derogation beyond “natural conditions” while maintaining 
pressure to strive for compliance see Water Directors Meeting, “The Future of the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) – Water Directors input to the fitness check process on experiences and challenges of WFD’s 
implementation and options for the way forward,” November 15, 2018.  
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17). The policy implication is that a nutrient management plan should be a starting point or provisional 
guide for joint investigation, by farmer and extension advisor, of environmental risks, and how most 
economically to address them. 
This kind of catchment program is part of a larger effort by the EPA and its partner institutions in water 
quality management to establish a cascading process of national, regional and local consultation to 
select areas for intervention and to ensure full and effective participation of the affected local actors in 
the execution of projects that concern them. The selection process and new governance institutions 
come together in “local catchment assessments”: field-level examinations by the local actors themselves 
of the source of pollution in water bodies identified as intervention priorities. This assessment 
determines the local work plan, specifying and prioritizing projects. Agricultural problems detected by 
field assessments are referred to specialist sustainability advisors who assist the implicated farmers to 
improve their nutrient management practices,11 linking contextualization of pollution mitigation 
measures on the farm to contextualization of water management at the catchment or territorial level. 
We draw three lessons for the design of the good jobs strategy from Irish and EU experience with 
environmental regulation of contextual uncertainty. First, while framework legislation (the WFD) and 
penalty defaults orient and incentivize the creation of new governance instruments for local adaptation 
of general policies, making those institutions actually work requires continuing revision of initial plans of 
light of—frequently disappointing—experience. The recent flurry of institution building in Irish water 
regulation is the culmination of systematic investigation and hard experience, punctuated by false starts 
and half measures. There are principles of design for these institutions, but no blueprints. 
Chief among these principles—the second lesson—is that contextualization in the sense of recognition 
of the need for local solutions to idiosyncratic local problems is a corrective and supplement to higher-
level decision making and procedures, but not a substitute for them. Local catchment assessments 
modify the specifications of targets identified by national and regional review, and the order they are 
approached. Local authorities and stakeholders are not free to disregard the national list of priorities. 
Lower levels correct higher levels and vice versa. We can think of contextualization of this kind as a 
variant of the reciprocal review of collaborators we encountered in contracting for innovation. 
Finally, contextualization blurs the distinction between regulation, directed to compliance with rules—
order maintenance within a given system—and the creation of new institutional systems. 
Contextualization induces collaboration between regulators, other public officials and regulated entities 
in the development of novel forms of capacity building and public participation in regulatory decision 
making. Irish dairy farmers in the catchment projects prepare their nutrient management plans with the 
support of specialist extension agents, who consult with catchment specialists; farmers with 
environmental problems collaborate with newly formed catchment assessment teams, connected in 
turn to a new corps of specialist sustainability advisors. Traditional extension agents propagate 
consolidated expertise. In co-developing improvement plans with individual farmers and each other 
these new specialists are reconsidering and revising current understandings as much as applying them. 
Collaborative investigation is necessary precisely because current rules and best practices run out; and 
establishing what should be done goes hand in hand with understanding and building the capacity 
                                                 
11  On ASSAP see https://www.teagasc.ie/environment/water-quality/farming-for-water-quality---assap/ 
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needed to do it. When we speak, as we do next, of regulation in relation to the good jobs strategy we 
mean the term in this enlarged sense of fixing (and revising) requirements and inducing the creation of 
novel institutions, with all their further spillovers, that enable the addressees of regulation to meet 
them.  
 
5. Applying the model to good jobs                                 
 
The concept of “good job,” like clean water, is imprecise and needs to be operationalized in a way that is 
both evolving and context-dependent. Reasonable, attainable targets for good-job creation must remain 
provisional, to be revised under new information. We can think of them as rebuttable presumptions, 
mandating behavior except when there is compelling evidence that they demand the impossible, or do 
not demand enough. Achieving the targets depends on decisions on investment, technological choice, 
and business organization, the consequences of which are unknowable ex ante. Governance under 
uncertainty takes as its starting point the provisionality of ends and means and the need for disciplined 
review and revision. Here we sketch what the model would look like when applied to the challenge of 
creating good jobs through public-private collaboration. We stress similarities, but also some 
differences.  
Simplifying greatly, the uncertainty government agencies face in the ARPA-E case is principally  about 
technological feasibility. The uncertainty in the dairy case derives largely from local adaptation. A good-
jobs program faces uncertainties of both kinds. Creating or preserving good jobs in a particular place 
often depends partly on extending technological capabilities: mastering techniques that are wholly 
novel (at least in some particular application) or so new to a given locale that they must almost be 
reinvented to be mastered. Here ARPA-E’s experience with active project management and 
collaborative review and adjustment of milestones is directly relevant. But fostering good jobs depends 
at least as much on solving highly idiosyncratic, place-specific problems: failures of coordination 
between local firms and training institutions; between firms and their (potential) supply-chain partners; 
and the managerial breakdowns or skill gaps within individual firms and institutions to which the 
coordination problems point. Here the peer assessment of local problems and new forms of 
collaboration with networks of extension experts developed in Irish pollution control come into their 
own. There are many ways to imagine integrating, or coordinating the operation of the two variants of 
the governance model in particular conditions; how precisely is a practical question, to be answered in 
context when the time comes, and provisionally—subject to correction—in accord with the precepts of 
the governance model itself. 
An immediate question has to do with the timing, scale and scope of the obligations (and penalty 
defaults) to be imposed on private firms. If there is a genuine good-jobs externality, and a national or 
subnational mandate to address it, there is no reason why in principle the obligation to do so should not 
be applied immediately to all firms in the relevant jurisdiction. But as just noted those obligations are 
inherently broad, open-ended and, at least initially, ill-defined. They would begin with the requirement 
to make plans to progress towards forms of organization and deployment of technology that in 
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combination produce better jobs, and to make such plans in coordination with relevant peers and 
institutional partners. But this may well be a too draconian first step. Unless we assume extraordinary 
consensus in favor of addressing the jobs externality or a dangerously coercive state authority, we can’t 
really imagine the regulator imposing on all firms, or even all firms in certain sectors, the obligation to 
make such plans; and if can’t imagine that, still less can we envisage penalty defaults for persistent 
failure to make good faith efforts to comply. 
It is easier to imagine imposing such requirement and penalties on actors who volunteer to participate 
in government programs designed to achieve the same outcome, and conferring benefits in the form of 
improved regulation, better coordination, extensive customized support services, or the like in return 
for participation. The framework goals, continuous monitoring and reporting requirements and penalty 
defaults (in the form of exclusion) would apply in this setting; but they would be the mutually agreed, 
common governance mechanism of a whole portfolio of industrial policy measures addressing the good-
jobs externality. The voluntary and selective nature of the partnership with state agencies suggests that 
this start-up phase the good jobs strategy could make use of ARPA-E’s governance of program 
definition—proceeding incrementally, and repeatedly exposing designs to objections and alternatives— 
and active project monitoring. 
A key benefit of these voluntary arrangements over the medium term is to develop an inventory of 
“good practices”—a repertoire of contextualization measures variously suited to a wide range of 
settings—that can eventually guide application of the good jobs strategy to a larger set of firms, cutting 
the costs and increasingly the chances for early successes of broader coverage. Put differently, the 
initial, selective projects would serve as a pilot program for the new system of regulation, with the 
qualification that pilots are usually understood as practical tests of promising concepts, whereas in this 
case their purpose would be more to identify and begin to refine promising approaches under real world 
conditions than subject them to definitive tests. As formal obligations are extended, the arrangements 
would come to resemble the European regulatory model, with a uniform requirement of participation 
but responses highly differentiated by locale. The need for contextualized support for the less capable 
actors drawn into the system would grow apace.  
An intermediate arrangement might also be possible. Firms might be asked to make a choice between 
participation in customized good-jobs compacts with public agencies and submitting to a fixed 
regulatory regime that imposed a common, universal set of benefits and obligations linked to job 
creation (for example, a schedule of tax incentives/penalties in return for an increase of x% per annum 
in the number of employees at wages at or above y% of the local median, where the rate of job creation 
may be tied to the business cycle). Firms would then self-select into their preferred regime, providing 
information, by their choices, about the relative effectiveness of the alternatives and, in time, suggesting 
revisions to them.    
With these design principles and staging practicalities in mind a good-jobs industrial policy could be 
introduced in four steps. First the government commits in legislation or by other means to address the 
problem of bad jobs and no jobs as a constitutional externality that threatens the foundations of our 
democracy and requires for its solution concerted cooperation between regulators, service provide and 
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private actors. The framing legislation mandates regulators with relevant authority to put in place 
information-generating regimes that allow for standard setting and revision. The same legislation 
creates an inter-agency body to periodically review, and prompt improvement of regulatory responses, 
and resolve coordination problem arising from them, and provides funds and authority for voluntary 
programs in anticipation of an eventual, step-wise extension of regulatory reach. 
Regulators who currently have delegated authority for areas directly affecting job abundance and 
quality—vocation training, agricultural and manufacturing extension, standard setting and the like—
introduce, in a second step, innovation-inducing and contextualizing governance mechanisms where 
these are not already in place, anticipating the need for support services to help vulnerable actors 
comply with increasingly demanding requirements. The requirements can take different forms, including 
specific employment quantity targets and/or standards.  
Where current regulatory authority doesn’t reach, the government creates volunteer, public private 
programs to advance the frontiers of technology and organization, or—and of equal and perhaps 
greater importance—provide support services and perhaps subsidies to help firms bridge the gap 
between their current low-productivity/low skill position and participation in the advanced sector. These 
programs, in their ensemble, would have to combine services to workers as well as managers; they 
would have to be customized to the needs of particular sectors and locales, and probably both. They 
would adhere to the design principles of innovation-inducing governance; their performance would be 
accordingly reviewed, and their goals adjusted, by the responsible agency, and then, if problems persist, 
the inter-agency body. 
Finally, conditional on the success of voluntary arrangements, the scope of these practices would 
gradually be made obligatory for non-participating firms, starting with requirements for submitting 
credible plans for improving the quality and quantity of jobs they offer, along with their competitive 
position, by better organization, use of skill and technology. Where appropriate plans should anticipate 
coordination with other firms and institutions. Penalty defaults would be imposed on laggard firms that, 
despite the availability of support services, persistently fail to comply. 
To place our proposed framework in sharper relief, we discuss briefly how it relates to some existing 
initiatives for promoting manufacturing and job creation.   
  
Comparison with current initiatives 
 
Of the three major components of the building good jobs program—extension services and cooperative 
research programs for existing firms; job creation and attraction policies; and active labor market 
policies or workforce development—it is to the last, workforce development, that the governance 
practices we described previously in advanced technology and European regulation have been most 
consistently applied—with demonstrable success. In the case of job attraction the experience has been 
nearly the reverse: Local and state politicians outbid each other to win outside investments in new 
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facilities, more often than not in deals that (in contrast to contracts for innovation) specify all terms of 
the exchange fully in advance: so much in subsidies for each job created at an agreed wage rate in a 
facility of an agreed type. Though there are important exceptions, in conspicuous, recent cases local 
learning is scarcely an afterthought. Extension services and cooperative research programs are an 
intermediate case, with successive waves of institutional innovation leaving the policy landscape dotted 
with small organizations that appear to do some good in their ambits, but in their isolation do not much 
effect the course of development (Block et al., 2018; Deloitte, 2017). These different outcomes, so far as 
we can see, reflect the vagaries of policy choices and economic flux, not the inherent ease or difficulty of 
pursuing contextualization strategies in the various domains. To all appearances, in fact, workforce 
development should be the most refractory terrain, since programs must engage at-risk groups and 
address many of the compound problems—financial, educational, familial—that notoriously vex social 
welfare services. The focus here therefore is on workforce development to illustrate an important 
application of our general governance principles to building good jobs; we refer to some prominent, 
recent cases of job attraction to underscore the difference between an approach which is deliberately 
sensitive to the uncertainties of context and one which deliberately is not. 
Many of the most successful workforce development programs trace back to Project QUEST (Quality 
Employment through Skills Training), founded in San Antonio in 1992,12 in response to a wave of plant 
closings—an early portent of broader dislocations to come. The displaced workers lacked the skills for 
the new jobs being created in health care, IT and other sectors; the service sector jobs for which they 
were qualified paid too little to support a middle-class family. Two faith-based social movement 
organizations, seeing the urgent need for a program to equip the region’s largely Hispanic population for 
good jobs, secured municipal funding to create Project QUEST (Warren, 2011).   
The new project faced a double challenge: On the one hand it had to identify emerging opportunities on 
the local labor market, alert the city’s community college system (then still inattentive to business 
needs) to them, and help shape the substance and timing of new courses to meet the needs of firms and 
students. On the other hand it had to learn to support a population of high-risk learners, almost of 
whom needed to pass difficult remedial courses to qualify for further study, and many of whom had 
family and financial burdens on top of anxieties about returning to school. 
In facing these challenges Project QUEST turned to former military men with long experience in 
workforce development. The first executive director was the former commander of the Air Force 
Recruiting Service; his successor, and many managers later hired, had a similar background. These 
managers brought with them not habits of military discipline and hierarchy but rather the culture of 
continuous improvement—the continuous monitoring of individual cases and rapid learning from 
disruptions at the core of our governance principles—that took root in many parts of the US military 
before it become standard operating procedure in much of the economy.13 An expression of this culture 
was the early creation of a dedicated management information system, highly unusual for an 
                                                 
12  Unless otherwise indicated this account of Project QUEST draws on (Rademacher et al., 2001). 
13  For the transformative effect of the introduction of a demanding variant of continuous improvement developed 
in the US nuclear navy on the regulation of nuclear power generation see Rees, 1996. 
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organization like Project QUEST at the time, to track the performance of individual students, both to 
keep their counselors abreast of their progress and to allow continuing review of overall organizational 
performance. 
To be eligible to participate in QUEST students must demonstrate need (generally earnings of less than 
50 percent of the local median wage) and levels of literacy and numeracy sufficient to ensure reasonable 
chances of succeeding at the intense remedial programs typically needed to prepare for the required, 
basic courses in community college programs. Once admitted students design in collaboration with a 
counselor a bundle of "wrap-around" services and supports to help them surmount stumbling blocks on 
the path to completing training, including subsides for tuition, child care or rent, or services to address 
problems of transportation, health or domestic violence. 
Counseling is continuous and intense. Students meet their counselors individually and in small, stable 
groups in weekly, hour-long sessions, where they share problems and devise mutual support strategies. 
A key purpose of these meetings is to identify and respond to emergent problems before they trigger a 
cascade of failure ending in withdrawal from the program. In effect the counseling sessions in 
combination with information of students’ class performance allows for continuous adjustment of the 
wrap-around support bundle. 
A recent RCT evaluation of the earnings of QUEST participants nine years after leaving the program 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach (Roder and Elliott, 2019). QUEST participants earn 
roughly ten percent more per year than the control group; and the gap does not diminish—and may be 
growing—over time. Crucially the difference in earnings is the greatest for the most at-risk subgroups: 
students who took part in QUEST when they were older than the normal school-going age, with 
children, and additional burdens. 
In recent years, as community colleges are increasingly drawn into training partnerships with local firms, 
more students from more diverse backgrounds seek new qualifications, and the failures of limited, “light 
touch” interventions to increase completion rates become more conspicuous, the schools themselves 
are successfully providing many of the individualized services originally offered by QUEST. A leading 
example is the Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP) of the City University of New York 
(CUNY).  
Like Project QUEST ASAP provides financial support (to bridge the gap between the available aid and 
tuition and other fees) and wrap-around services, above all a dedicated advisor for each student who 
furnishes frequent and comprehensive support. Again a principle goal is to identify and resolve issues 
before a student drops out of school (Weiss et al., forthcoming). Cumulatively, over the course of the 
three-year program, these these customized interventions have produced a striking increase in 
completion rates. Nearly 40 percent of the students in the program group in an RCT study graduated by 
the end of the program; the graduation rate for control group students was 22 percent. What makes 
ASAP uniquely successful, the authors of the study find, “is that its multiple, integrated, and well-
implemented services address multiple prevalent barriers to student success, and those services are 
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offered for three full years” (Weiss et al., forthcoming, np): in our terms, continuing contextualization 
based on continuous monitoring.  
We would expect a program designed to adjust to local circumstance to be scalable, and ASAP is proving 
to be. Since 2014 three Ohio community college have implemented ASAP, and early impact assessments 
show results comparable to those obtained in New York (Sommo et al., 2018). Community college 
leaders are following the success of ASAP closely and devising their own systems of comprehensive 
support, with the goal, in the words of one, of “making help unavoidable.” In the most ambitious cases 
growing confidence in the ability to train low-skill workers is encouraging community colleges to  enter 
extensive partnerships with large firms such as Amazon, where the school offers customized training 
and student support and the company pays tuition expenses, synchronizes the work schedule of 
participating employees to mesh with school needs and, perhaps most crucially, provides a career 
ladder from unskilled work into management for those who complete the program.14 
If workforce development programs are increasingly aware of the need for continuous learning in 
response to the uncertainties of context, programs that directly target employment creation by 
attracting inward investment seldom are. The most visible of such programs, typically administered by 
states rather than the Federal government, are tax incentives provided to large investors in return for 
specific commitments on job creation. The Foxconn and Amazon deals, in Wisconsin and New York, 
respectively, are recent high-profile examples. The Taiwanese company Foxconn had agreed to create 
13,000 well-paying jobs in Wisconsin in return for more than $4.5 billion in government incentives. 
Amazon promised creating 25,000 jobs over a decade in return from an incentive package from New 
York valued at nearly $3 billion. Both arrangements have blown amidst controversy; their failures are 
instructive in ways that demonstrate the superiority of the alternative approach we are suggesting here.  
Essentially, the Foxconn and Amazon deals – as well as similar tax incentive programs – were predicated 
on ex-ante contractibility (and hence a stable environment). With enough predictability about market 
and technology conditions, firms can make rational calculations about employment commitments. And 
the states have the assurance that firms will deliver. Once the contract is written down, the state 
remains at arms’ length from the firm. In Amazon’s case, the company said it wanted cities to “think 
big.” In reality, as one commentator has noted, “the creative thinking was exclusively focused on 
incentive offers” (Jensen 2019). If the firm turns out to be unwilling or unable to carry out the terms of 
the contract – as was the case with Foxconn and Amazon, the former because unforeseen changes in 
demand and technology and the latter because of unexpected political fallout – there is little room for 
revision or renegotiation.  
Bartik (2018, 2019) has studied such tax incentive programs more broadly and concludes that, even 
when they work, they are not very cost effective. This is especially true when local incentives have to be 
financed by cuts in public expenditures elsewhere (e.g., education or infrastructure). Bartik argues that 
the most effective employment programs focus specifically on local labor demand and supply 
                                                 
14  Interview with David T. Harrison, President, Columbus State Community College, Columbus, Ohio, April 18, 
2019. 
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conditions. He emphasizes three strategies in particular. The first—and, Bartik finds, by far the most cost 
effective—is the provision of customized public services to small and medium-sized enterprises. These 
include job training tailored to local employers and run by local community colleges, and 
“manufacturing extension services” that provide marketing and technology advice. The second is 
targeted investments in workers’ skills and training, ranging from pre-school programs to wage 
subsidies, and the third is infrastructure programs that increase land supply and thereby lower business 
costs.  
All three strategies are consistent with our emphasis on iterative fine-tuning and evolving standard 
setting in lieu of ex-ante rules. The design of locally effective incentive packages along these lines 
obviously requires extensive information discovery and trial-and-error on the part of local development 
agencies, heightening the importance of organizational arrangements of the type we have discussed 
here. Note also that while Bartik’s (2018) focus is on manufacturing employment, our proposals would 
apply to service sectors as well. This is important since it is unlikely that the long-term, secular decline in 
the share of manufacturing employment can be reversed.    
More broadly, good practice in industrial policy has moved away from presumptive approaches that 
assume the government has a good fix on the underlying problem and the requisite solutions. For 
example, industrial parks of enterprise zones presume the absence of good jobs is due to, say, high taxes 
and poor infrastructure and create spaces where neither is a problem. Such pre-packaged solutions 
work poorly when firms face differentiated obstacles – lack of workers with appropriate skills or 
inadequate access to specialized technologies, for example. The collaborative framework we have 
outlined here has the advantage that it is explicitly diagnostic – i.e., focused on information discovery.  
 
6. A reason not to despair and a reason to hope                                                        
 
In contrast to standard remedies that deal with the pre-production (e.g. schooling) or post-production 
(e.g. taxation) stages of the economy, our approach directly targets production. The motivation is that 
private producers, left to their own, do not take the social costs of the scarcity of good jobs into 
account. In the absence of government action, production is not efficient. An important implication is 
that the traditional distinction between distribution and production no longer makes sense. Efficient 
production and distributive inclusion are two sides of the same coin. One cannot achieve one without 
the other. Questions of production – how goods and services are provided, which types of investments 
are made, what is the direction of technological change – are placed right at the heart of political 
economy and justice analysis.    
We conclude on two positive notes. First, we argue that the prevailing academic pessimism about job 
creating strategies may be misplaced as it is based on conflating treatments with meta-treatments. 
Second, we note the possibility that the governance arrangements we have sketched out may also help 
enlarge the constituency for acting on the problems they address.   
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Consider first the point about policy pessimism. The literature we have referred to briefly in the 
introduction suggests there are few, if any, policies that work reliably to expand good jobs. The 
conclusion to which such findings often lead is either some combination of agnosticism (as in Austen et 
al., 2018) or a call for more randomized evaluations (as in Autor et al., 2019). Under our approach, these 
mixed results are not a surprise. The dual challenge of dealing with uncertainty and contextualization 
implies there are no fixed, clear-cut remedies. What is important is to get the governance regime right. 
With the appropriate regime in place, the hope would be that each locality can develop its own set of 
evolving practices. In the language of RCTs, our treatment is really a meta-treatment: a protocol for 
figuring out the treatment to apply in a particular setting. Correspondingly, proper evaluations would 
have to be carried out at the level of the governing regimes rather than individual policies.  
Next, the point about building constituency. In many discussions of industrial strategy the principle 
problem is creating a coalition of public and private interests in favor of development. The first task is 
rallying a national or local coalition of private and public actors in favor of a growth strategy with clear, 
immediate objectives. The formation of consensus and the clarification of objectives leads naturally to 
the creation of public-private partnerships to advance particular projects. The public actors contribute 
their expertise and authority in, say regulation; private actors make complementary contributions with 
respect to markets and their firms. So long as the state retains sufficient autonomy to avoid capture the 
governance of the industrial policy projects is part and parcel of the consensus that underpins the 
public-private partnerships. 
We agree that building political will is a threshold condition for industrial policy. Full deployment of the 
good jobs strategy would eventually require national mobilization. But under current conditions—when 
development is as likely to depend on exploring and building domestic capacities as accumulating know-
how and capital; when uncertainty makes the selection of goals necessarily provisional and the revision 
of ends and means routine—governance of a good jobs strategy can presume only a thin, initial, 
background consensus, and does not grow directly from it. On the contrary: Fear that, under 
uncertainty, ambitious and urgently needed programs cannot be effectively and accountably 
administered could cast a shadow over consensus building, causing some potential members of a 
coalition in favor of a good jobs strategy to back away from a risky venture.  
An attractive feature of the approach here is that the same institutions of interactive governance that 
enable the parties to specify and solve the problems they face under uncertainty also enable them to 
develop the trust and mutual reliance they need to deepen and broaden their efforts. The broad 
coalition needed for the good-jobs strategy to succeed need not pre-exist; it can and will likely be the 
result of pursuing the strategy. Innovative modes of governance allow the parties, beginning with only a 
vague understanding of the substance and scope of their goals, to assess one another’s capacities and 
good faith in the very process of refining ideas of what the eventual project should be. Trust and 
coalition building—the acceptance of mutual vulnerability—are as much or more the outcome of joint 
problem solving as its precondition. 
A further advantage of this governance approach in coalition building is its compatibility, indeed natural 
affinity, with efforts at broad mobilization to address societal problems under uncertainty in other 
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domains. The Green New Deal (GND) is the most prominent example. The GND goes beyond the classic 
remedy of carbon pricing to contemplate large-scale investments in green technologies and ambitious 
programs to foster greater economic opportunities. Every which way it turns—whether confronting 
environmental problems or creating employment, and most especially doing both together—the GND 
will wrestle with the contextualization of familiar ideas to countless local setting and the collaborative 
exploration of the technological frontier that gave rise to the design principles of our good jobs strategy.  
At bottom that strategy enlists some of the fundamental governance lessons of successful 
environmentalism in the service of employment creation. It would hardly be a surprise if the GND, 
combining goals that only recently seemed distinct, reached similar conclusions, creating the core of a 
broad coalition that helps respond effectively to the economic, social and environmental externalities 
presently threatening our democracies and our planet. 
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